S
earch-based theories of the exchange process provide economists with a way of formalizing the microfoundations of monetary economics and to discuss a variety of issues in monetary theory and policy in a new light.
1 Many questions that cannot even be formulated in more traditional monetary models can be profitably analyzed in these new models. In this essay, we propose to review recent developments using search-based models to study some international monetary issues.
There seems little doubt that international monetary economics is of central importance today. Of the types of questions one would ultimately like to answer, consider these:
• Should Europe adopt a common currency?
• If so, should individual countries continue to issue local currencies?
• If a state or province separates from a nation (as Quebec periodically discusses in Canada), how should it design its monetary system?
• Should more Latin American countries adopt currency boards, where each unit of local currency is backed by central bank reserves in U.S. dollars (as in Argentina)?
• Should more Latin American countries simply abandon their local currency and switch to U.S. dollars (as Panama did)?
Though we do not claim to be ready to provide definitive answers to all of these important questions at this time, we do think that search-theoretic models are in principle well suited to address these types of issues. More traditional theory, including models that include cash-in-advance or money-in-the-utility-function type assumptions, are clearly ill suited in this regard. They are ill suited because too much is decided by assumption. In particular, the answer to the question, "Which monies circulate in which countries?" is determined at the outset by the modeler when he chooses which money to put in which cash-in-advance constraint or in which utility function. In contrast, search models are designed to determine endogenously which monies circulate where.
We begin by reviewing a version of the model in Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) . Basically, it can be described as follows. There are two countries, each of which issues its own currency. There is a meeting or matching technology that describes the frequency with which a given individual interacts with other individuals, both locals and foreigners (it is assumed that one interacts with individuals from one's own country more often than a foreigner interacts with these same individuals). When two agents meet, one with money and the other with real output for sale, they have to decide whether to trade. Parameter values, as well as expectations regarding other agents' behavior, jointly determine this decision and thereby determine the realm of circulation for each currency. Potentially there are three disAlberto Trejos is an assistant professor at Northwestern University. Randall Wright is professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania, and consultant to the Federal Reserve Banks of Cleveland and Minneapolis.
tinct types of equilibria-or regimes-in which we are interested, where none, one, or both of the currencies circulate internationally.
This model allows one to answer questions like the following:
• What features of a country make it possible, or likely, for its currency to circulate internationally?
• How and when can local currencies survive in the presence of a universally accepted international currency?
• Does an international currency emerge naturally as economies become integrated?
• What are the costs and benefits to a country of having its currency serve as an international medium of exchange?
• An extension of this model in Zhou (1994) additionally allows one to study the issue of when agents would want to exchange currencies in such a world.
There are shortcomings with the models mentioned in the previous paragraph. Perhaps the most obvious is that in these models, as in all of the first-generation search-based models of money, every exchange is assumed to be a one-for-one trade. This simplifying assumption makes it possible to discuss the process of exchange-and, in particular, which objects circulate as media of exchange among which agents-without tackling the determination of the relative values of these objects. Unfortunately, however, it obviously also makes it impossible to talk about prices or exchange rates. Therefore, we also present the extension of the model in Trejos and Wright (1995b) designed to endogenize prices using bargaining theory. This extension allows us to raise a whole range of new issues, including the following:
• How does the fact that a currency circulates internationally affect its purchasing power at home?
• Where does an international currency purchase more-at home or abroad?
• What are the effects on seigniorage and welfare in each country when one money becomes an international currency?
• How are policies designed to maximize either seigniorage or welfare affected by concerns of currency substitution?
• How are national monetary policies connected, and what is the scope for international cooperation?
In the next section, we outline the basic assumptions on which the model is built. The third section presents the indivisible output version of the model in Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) . We then present the divisible output model with bargaining in Trejos and Wright (1995b), followed by a discussion of some policy implications. The final section presents some brief conclusions.
THE BASIC MODEL
The economy consists of two countries, labeled i = 1, 2. One's country is important in that it determines the frequency with which one interacts with other agents. Individuals interact, or meet, bilaterally according to a random matching process in continuous time, andˆi j denotes the Poisson arrival rate at which a citizen of Country i meets citizens of Country j. We assume thatˆi i ≥ˆj i for j ≠ i. This simply says that, for example, a Mexican meets Mexicans more frequently than an American meets Mexicans.
Each country starts with a large number of citizens, and the fraction of individuals from Country i is N i with N 1 + N 2 = 1. Thereafter, both populations grow at the 2 Bargaining was first introduced into (one-country) search models of money in Trejos and Wright (1995a) and Shi (1995b) . Other recent applications include Aiyagari et al. (1996 ), Trejos (1994 , and Shi (1995a).
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same rate ≥ 0. The population sizes and the meeting technology parameters are not independent because we have the identity N 1ˆ12 = N 2ˆ21 (both sides of the equality give the total number of international meetings per unit time). Here we takeˆi j as primitive and let the populations be free to satisfy this identity. A special case is the specification actually used in Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) , which haŝ ii = N 1 andˆi j = *N j , with * < . Thus, arrival rates are proportional to country size, but they are smaller across countries than they are within countries. As * gets closer to , the two countries become more integrated.
3
Agents are distinguished not only by their country and date of birth, but also by their tastes and technologies. As in the typical monetary search model, we need to adopt some notion of specialization. Here, for simplicity, it is assumed that there are K ≥ 3 goods and the population of each country contains equal numbers of K types, where each Type k consumes only Good k and produces only Good k +1 (modulo K; that is, Type K produces Good 1). If we assume that meetings are random with respect to consumption-production type, then ij =ˆi j / K is the rate at which a citizen of Country i meets a citizen of Country j who consumes the good he produces; it is also the rate at which the citizen of Country i meets a citizen of Country j who produces the good he consumes.
There is no centralized market or auctioneer in this model: All trade is bilateral and quid pro quo. The large number of agents rules out private credit because the probability of meeting a particular individual a second time is zero. Our specification for tastes and technologies rules out direct barter. We also make the assumption that goods are nonstorable, which rules out commodity money. Hence, trade requires the use of some form of fiat money as a medium of exchange. However-and this is the crucial pointwe do not impose that any particular currency plays this role in any particular transaction. This is what distinguishes the class of models under consideration from ones with particular cash-in-advance or money-in-the-utility-function assumptions imposed exogenously. 4 Fiat money is introduced by the government of Country j issuing one unit of Currency j to some fraction M j ∈ (0,1) of its newborn citizens, at each point in time, in exchange for some amount of real output (how much real output depends on what assumptions we make). Issuing money in this way yields a continuous flow of seigniorage, although notice that the only time private agents interact with the government is when they first enter the economy. In the special case where = 0, the government simply issues an input of currency to some fraction of its citizens at the initial date and then shuts down.
To keep things tractable, we make the following assumptions. First, we assume that an agent holding a unit of currency always spends it all at once, which could obviously be guaranteed if we simply say that the monetary object is indivisible. This implies that no one holding currency ever holds less than one unit. Second, we assume that, except for the newborn, no agent can produce until after he consumes. This implies that two agents with currency do not trade with each other, and no one ever holds more than one unit of money. Hence at each point in time there will be some agents with one unit of money each, called buyers, and a disjoint group with no money, called sellers. Let the fraction of buyers from Country i with Currency j be denoted m ij , and the fraction of sellers from Country i be denoted m i0 = 1 − m i1 − m i2 . Then the vector m = (m ij ) completely describes the asset distribution across agents.
What happens when a buyer and seller meet depends on which version of the model we consider. In Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) We distinguish the different types of possible equilibria-or different regimesas follows. Let j = 1 if within Country j we see Currency i ≠ j in circulation, in which case we call Currency i an international currency; and let j = 0 if in Country j we do not see Currency i in circulation. Then a regime is a list of values for = ( 1 , 2 ). The four possible regimes are = (0,0), (1,1), (0,1), and (1,0). In the first case there is no international currency; in the second case both currencies are international; and in the final two cases only one currency is international. Because the last two are mirror images, we focus for now only on the latter, = (1,0). Hence there are three cases to consider, with either 0, 1, or 2 international monies.
5
Given a regime, one can determine the steady-state values of m ij , independent of whether output is divisible, as follows. First, note that i = 0 implies m ij = 0 (if Americans never trade for pesos then they never hold pesos). Second, note that trades between a buyer and seller of the same nationality do not alter m because they leave the aggregate distribution unchanged. These considerations imply that the steady-state equations are Given the asset distribution, the idea is to use dynamic programming to solve the individual decision problems concerning when to trade. The next section considers the model with indivisible output, where every trade is a one-for-one swap. The section after that considers the case where output is divisible and agents bargain.
THE MODEL WITH INDIVISIBLE OUTPUT
Here we analyze the model with indivisible output. This is a useful first step, in that it allows us to determine the circumstances under which the different cur rencies will be used in transactions between different agents without simultaneously solving the bargaining problems facing these agents. For simplicity, we are interested here only in steady-state equilibria, where the asset distribution and trading strategies are constant with respect to 5 In the model in Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) , these are the only possible regimes, except for possibly equilibria where at most one of the monies has value or equilibria that are the same except for relabeling in the sense that we call American money pesos and Mexican money dollars. In the model in Trejos and Wright (1995b) , there are other candidate regimes, where whether Seller j takes Currency i depends on who the buyer is (say, Mexican sellers take dollars from Americans but not from other Mexicans); but these candidate regimes can never be equilibria under relatively weak restrictions.
time. We also restrict attention to purestrategy equilibria. Let the utility from consuming a unit of one's consumption good be U and the disutility of producing one's production good be C, where 0 ≤ C < U. Let V ij denote the expected lifetime utility for a buyer from Country i with Currency j, and V i0 expected lifetime utility for a seller from Country i with no money. Let V = (V ij ). We call these the value functions. They satisfy the following flow versions of the Bellman equations from dynamic programming,
where r is the rate of time preference. The value functions are indexed by the agent' s nationality, i, but not by his (consumption/production specialization) type, k, because we will only consider equilibria that are symmetric in the sense that all types use the same strategy and receive the same payoff in equilibrium. The Bellman equations are interpreted as follows. Equation 3 says that the flow value of being a seller from Country i is the rate at which one meets local or foreign buyers with Currency i multiplied by the gain from trade in such a meeting, plus the rate at which one meets local or foreign buyers with Currency j multiplied by the gain from trade if such a meeting results in trade (that is, if i = 1). Equation 4 says that the flow value to holding domestic money is the rate at which one meets local sellers (who always take local currency) or foreign sellers who take local currency (which they do if i = 1) multiplied by the gain from trading. Equation 5 has a similar interpretation. Whether exchange occurs in a meeting depends here exclusively on the seller because the buyer wants to trade in every meeting where the seller can produce his desired consumption good-he gets an indivisible unit of output in every trade. Recall that here we look only for equilibria where sellers always want to trade for local currency, although it still has to be checked that this is rational. The interesting issue is whether a seller wants to trade for foreign currency. Whether he wants to trade for foreign money depends on the following incentive condition:
That is, a seller accepts foreign money just in case the value of holding foreign money minus production costs exceeds the value of remaining a seller (and waiting for local money).
An equilibrium here can be defined as a list ( ,m,V) satisfying equations 1-7. For each possible regime we will solve equations 1-5 and check equations 6-7; if equations 6-7 are satisfied, this regime constitutes an equilibrium. In this way we can determine the parameter values that allow the existence of each type of equilibrium. For simplicity, and to facilitate comparison with Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) , we consider here only the limiting case where C → 0.
NO INTERNATIONAL MONEY
Consider first the regime with no international money, and, therefore, no international trade: = (0,0). In this case equations 1-2 imply m ii = M i and m ij = 0 for j ≠ i. To see when this regime actually constitutes an equilibrium, insert m and = 0 into equations 3-5 to yield
Note that in this regime, citizens of Country i never actually hold Currency j ≠ i, but V ij gives the value they would achieve if they were to accept Cur rency j.
We need to check two things: the maintained hypothesis that agents always accept local currency and the incentive conditions in equations 6-7 that say, in this case, that they do not accept foreign currency. The former is satisfied for all parameter values in this case. Hence it remains only to check V ij ≤ V i0 . Simple algebra implies that this holds if and only if
One thing we can conclude from this analysis is that for this regime to constitute an equilibrium we require ij to be small relative to ii . If one meets foreigners frequently enough, then it is not rational to reject foreign money even if you expect local sellers will reject it. Hence a very open economy is not likely to settle on an equilibrium where foreign money does not circulate. Another thing we can conclude is that for this regime to constitute an equilibrium, we require M j to be big. If there are few foreign buyers and many foreign sellers, then it is easier to spend foreign money, and so you should accept it even if you expect local sellers will reject it. Other parameters have similarly reasonable effects.
TWO INTERNATIONAL MONIES
Now turn to the regime with two international currencies, = (1,1). The first thing to do is to solve equations 1-2 for m ij . Routine algebra yields the steady state for citizens of Country 1, which can be described by
The steady state for citizens of Country 2 is described by reversing the subscripts. Notice that m i0 is decreasing in both M 1 and M 2 . The value functions now satisfy:
These equations imply that V ii = V ij . That is, buyers from either country are indifferent between holding Currency i and Currency j ≠ i. So the currencies are perfect substitutes. It also follows that V ii > V i0 , and so equations 6-7 are satisfied for all parameter values. Hence, this regime always constitutes an equilibrium. The intuition is that if agents believe the two currencies will be accepted by all sellers then it is always rational for them to accept both currencies themselves.
ONE INTERNATIONAL MONEY
We now turn to the regime where citizens of Country 1 accept Currency 2, but notviceversa, = (1,0).Onecansolveequations 1-2 for m 11 = M 1 and m 21 = 0. The distribution of Currency 2 holdings is given by:
From these one can show that, for given values of M i , m 10 is lower and m 20 higher in this regime than in the other regimes. Also, m i0 is decreasing in both M 1 and M 2 .
The value functions for agents from Country 1 satisfy ( One thing that follows immediately from these equations is that V i2 > V i0 , so citizens from both countries are willing to accept Currency 2. Hence, to show when this regime constitutes an equilibrium, we need to check the incentive constraints V 11 ≥ V 10 (to check that it is rational for Country 1 sellers to accept Currency 1) and that V 21 ≤ V 20 (to check that it is rational for Country 2 sellers to reject Currency 1). The first condition is satisfied if and only if These can be interpreted as saying that it is relatively easy for a buyer from Country 1 to find a Country 1 seller, but relatively hard for a Country 2 buyer to find a Country 1 seller.
MODEL SUMMARY
Here we summarize what has been learned from the preceding analysis. Given our maintained assumptions, there are three qualitatively different types of equilibria. There is at most one equilibrium of each type (that is, each implies a unique m and V). Properties of the different regimes include: In Figure 1a we examine the set of equilibria for different values of M 1 and M 2 , holding the other parameters fixed. If a region in the figure contains the label ( 1 , 2 ), then regime = ( 1 , 2 ) is an equilibrium in this region. zens from Country i find that either buying or selling locally is too difficult and find it too tempting to take foreign money that can be spent easily. The figure also tells us about the existence regions for equilibria = (1,0) and = (0,1); Currency 1 will be a unique international currency as long as it is not too abundant and Currency 2 is not too scarce. In Figure 1b we examine different values of 11 and 12 , holding the other parameters fixed. We see that as Country 1 becomes more open ( 12 is large relative to 11 ), it is more difficult to sustain an equilibrium where 1 = 0, or where 2 = 1. The opposite implications occur as local trade in that country becomes easier (that is, as 11 becomes larger).
For many parameter values there exist multiple equilibria. Hence, which regime we end up in depends to a large degree on expectations. At the same time, fundamentals-that is, preferences, technology, and the values of M 1 and M 2 -exert an important influence. At least in some cases, a particular regime cannot be an equilibrium unless these fundamentals take on the right values.
An interesting extension is the one analyzed by Zhou (1994) , who considers a version of the model where agents differentiate between home and foreign goods. A given agent gets utility, u, from his preferred good and < u from the other good, where his preferred good fluctuates between domestic and imported, and back again, according to Poisson processes. Agents may consume only preferred goods or some of both goods in equilibrium, depending on parameter values and on the type of equilibrium. In this model there can also be currency exchanges in pure strategy equilibria. For example, when a Mexican holding a peso but having a taste for American goods meets an American holding a dollar but having a taste for Mexican goods, there is an incentive for them to swap monies in any regime other than = (1,1) (because in that regime the currencies are perfect substitutes).
In any case, one shortcoming of the model as it stands is that every trade is a one-for-one swap. This of course makes it impossible to discuss the way nominal prices and exchange rates depend on various components of the model. The extension in the next section remedies this.
THE MODEL WITH DIVISIBLE OUTPUT
We now turn to the model with divisible output. It is still assumed that when buyers spend their money, they spend it all, but now the amount of output they get for their money will be determined endogenously. When a seller produces q units of output for a buyer (of the right type), the latter enjoys utility, u(q), while the former suffers disutility, c(q). With no loss in generality, we can normalize c(q) = q, as long as we also renormalize u(q). This simply means that agents bargain in terms of utils and not physical units of output. We assume that u(0) = 0, u′(0) > 1, u′(q) > 0 for all q > 0, u″(q) < 0 for all q > 0, and there exists q > 0 such that u(q) =q. We need to appeal to some form of bilateral bargaining theory to determine q. For example, one could use the generalized Nash bargaining solution. This says that when a buyer from Country i with Currency j meets a seller from Country h, if they trade at all, the quantity q solves the following problem:
In this problem, q maximizes the so-called Nash product, which is the payoff to the buyer, u(q) + V i0 , minus his threat point, V ij , all to the power , times the payoff to the seller, −q + V hj , minus his threat point, V h0 , all to the power 1 − . The payoffs are what the agents get if they trade, the threat points a re what they get if they do not trade, and represents the relative bargaining power in the hands of the buyer. The constraints say that agents must get a greater payoff from trading than from not trading.
7
For simplicity, we assume here that the buyer has all the bargaining power: = 1. This effectively means that he can make a take it or leave it offer to the seller. Two things follow immediately from this. First, assuming that the buyer wants to trade, he offers to exchange his money for the quantity that makes the seller indifferent between accepting and rejecting (that is, the second constraint will bind). Second, this implies that the seller never gets any of the gains from trade, and therefore V i0 = 0. Hence when a buyer from Country i with Currency j meets a seller from Country h, if they trade at all, then the quantity is given by (28) q hj = V hj .
Note that this quantity depends on the nationality of the seller and the currency being used, but not on the nationality of the buyer. Also note that the nominal price of output in Country h in terms of Currency j is p hj = 1/q hj . By construction, the seller always wants to trade at the take-it-or-leave-it offer. It is possible, however, that a buyer may prefer to not trade at these terms. For example, although an American seller will always take pesos at some price, a buyer with pesos may prefer to wait until he meets a Mexican seller if the seller is expected to be willing to agree to a sufficiently better price. A buyer with Currency j is willing to trade with a seller from Country i if and only if the utility he derives from consuming q ij exceeds the value to keeping his money and spending it elsewhere. Hence the following incentive condition must be satisfied if regime is to constitute an equilibrium:
The value functions for buyers satisfy
for j ≠ i. We write equations 31 and 32 in this way to facilitate comparison with the model in the previous section; in particular, see equations 4 and 5. However, strictly speaking, equations 31 and 32 are not exactly correct without some modification in the framework, for the following reason. Consider, for example, the case j = 0, which says that Currency i does not circulate in Country j. Then equation 31 says that a buyer from Country i with Currency i who meets a seller from Country j cannot trade. But, given the bargaining rules, he always could offer to trade and get V ji > 0 (the amount a seller from Country j is willing to give for Cur rency i), and in principle we should allow him that option. In fact, one can show that even if agents believe that j = 0, a buyer from Country i with Currency i who meets a 7 See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for an extended discussion on Nash bargaining and its relation to explicit strategic bargaining games.
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seller from Country j will offer to trade.
8
This means that j = 0 can never be an equilibrium in the model as it stands. However, this result is really just an artifact of our simplifying assumptions that the buyer gets to make a take it or leave it offer and there is no possibility of direct barter. Relaxing either of these allows j = 0 to be an equilibrium for some parameter values, although it also complicates the model significantly. We can maintain the simplicity of the present set up and still generate equilibria with j = 0 in another (albeit perhaps less satisfactory) way, as follows. First, expand the bargaining game so that a seller has to decide whether to enter negotiations with a buyer before the buyer gets to make his take it or leave it offer. Then, given certain additional technical assumptions, it will be an equilibrium for the seller to refuse to trade given that he believes j = 0. In this case, equations 31 and 32 do describe the value functions as functions of . See Trejos and Wright (1995b), for details.
Define the vectors q = (q ij ), V = (V ij ), and m = (m ij ). Then an equilibrium is now a list ( , m, V, q) satisfying equations 1-2 and equations 28-32. Henceforth we ignore the value functions because they are redundant by virtue of the equilibrium condition V ij = q ij . Therefore, a steady-state equilibrium is completely characterized by the regime , the asset distribution m, and the values of the currencies q.
NO INTERNATIONAL MONEY
Consider first = (0,0). First, note that m does not depend on whether output is divisible, so we already know the asset distribution from the previous section (this is, of course, true in any regime). Now equations 31-32 can be rearranged to show that prices satisfy
for j ≠ i. In this regime, no transactions actually occur at q ij for j ≠ i, but q ij but tells us how much one could get with Currency j from Country i sellers.
It is not hard to show that, as long as this equilibrium exists, q i i and q j i a re both dec reasing in M i , and are independent of M j for j ≠ i. Also, q 1 1 > q 2 2 if and only if 1 1 (1 − M 1 ) > 2 2 (1 − M 2 ). Because one unit of Currency i buys q i i units of real output, we can say that one unit of Currency 1 is w o rth e = q 1 1 /q 2 2 = p 22 /p 1 1 units of Curre n c y 2. This is the exchange rate that would be implied by purchasing power parity.
9 T h e exchange rate e falls with M 1 and rises with M 2 . Also, e rises with 1 1 and falls with 2 2 . Of course, international diff e rences in utility and production functions would also influence e. We have kept these the same across countries purely for notational simplicity.
To see when this regime actually constitutes an equilibrium, we must check the maintained hypothesis that Currency i circulates in Country i and the incentive conditions in equations 29-30. The former can easily be seen to hold for all parameter values. The latter, which says that individuals with Currency j do not want to buy from sellers from Country i, holds if and only if u(q ij ) ≤ q jj , for i ≠ j. Using equations 33-34, we can rewrite this inequality as (35) which is satisfied if and only if ij is small compared with jj . The intuition is similar to the model with indivisible output.
TWO INTERNATIONAL MONIES
Now turn to the regime with two international currencies, = (1,1). One can show that in this regime q ii = q ij = Q i ; That is, the two currencies are perfect substitutes in the sense that they purchase the same amount from a given seller. If there were a market in which agents 8 We thank Rao Aiyagari for pointing this out to us.
9 Suppose one peso buys q 11 units of output in Mexico and one dollar buys q 22 units of output in America, and suppose that there is a market in which currencies can be traded at the nominal exchange rate e (that is, one peso buys e dollars). Then one peso could be used to buy eq 22 units of output in America using dollars. Purchasing power parity holds if a peso buys the same amount directly at home and using dollars abroad: q 11 eq 22 .
could trade the two currencies, the market clearing price would have to be 1. But the purchasing power parity exchange rate, as defined above, is given by e = Q 1 /Q 2 . In general e differs from unity in this regime: Even though quantities do not depend on which currency the buyer is using, they do depend on the nationality of the seller. One can also show that Q 1 and Q 2 are both decreasing in M 1 and M 2 . Thus an increase in either money supply increases the price level in both countries. Also, as long as the two countries are not too different in terms of ij and M j , the effect of a change in M 1 is stronger in Country 1 than in Country 2 and vice versa. This means that the purchasing power parity exchange rate e = Q 1 /Q 2 is decreasing in M 1 and increasing in M 2 .
To see when this regime constitutes an equilibrium, we need to check the incentive conditions in equations 29-30. These hold in this regime if and only if u(Q i ) ≥ Q j , j ≠ i. If the countries are symmetric, in the sense that M 1 = M 2 , ii = jj and ij = ji , these conditions always hold and the equilibrium with two international currencies always exists. But if they are sufficiently dissimilar, then the incentive conditions will be violated and = (1,1) is not an equilibrium. The model is very different in this regard from the one with indivisible output. In that model, equilibrium = (1,1) exists for all parameter values. Here, even if the two countries' currencies are perfect substitutes, the two nationalities of sellers are not. For example, if jj is low relative to ii then Country j sellers do not give much for (either) currency compared with Country i sellers, and Country i buyers may prefer to hold on to their cash rather than spend it in Country j.
ONE INTERNATIONAL MONEY
We now turn to the regime where citizens of Country 1 accept Currency 2, but not vice versa, = (1,0). The purchasing power of the national currency is given by which are qualitatively the same as in the = (0,0) regime. Because m 10 is lower in this regime than in = (0,0), q 11 and q 21 are lower here. Intuitively, the influx of foreign money inflates prices denominated in the domestic currency. Also, q 11 and q 21 are decreasing in both M 1 and M 2 because m 10 is decreasing in both M 1 and M 2 .
The purchasing power of the international currency depends on the seller, as given by
There is a unique nonzero solution for (q 12 , q 22 ) and both are decreasing in M 1 and M 2 . Since m 10 is lower and m 20 higher in this regime, q 12 is lower here than in the = (1,1) regime. Moreover, q 12 > q 11 , with the difference increasing in M 1 − M 2 . Hence, citizens of Country 1 value the international currency more than their own domestic currency. As long as the countries are not too dissimilar, one can also show that q 22 > q 12 .
We still need to check when this equilibrium exists. The maintained hypothesis that Currency i always circulates in Country i holds if and only if u(q 22 ) ≥ q 12 .
10 Then equations 29-30 require u(q 12 ) ≥ q 22 , so Country 2 buyers with Currency 2 buy from Country 1 sellers, and u(q 21 ) ≤ q 11 , so that Country 1 buyers with Currency 1 do not buy from Country 2 sellers. Each of these conditions looks qualitatively like one that has been encountered earlier and holds under similar circumstances; however, because q ij differs across regimes, the parameter values for which the equilibria exist are quantitatively different. 
DIVISIBLE OUTPUT SUMMARY
As in the indivisible output model, there are three qualitatively different regimes and at most one equilibrium of each type (that is, each implies a unique m and q). Other things being equal, the value of a currency is higher if it circulates internationally and lower if the other money circulates internationally. Other properties of the different regimes include the following: In Figure 2a we examine different values of M 1 and M 2 , holding the other parameters fixed. Notice that the regime = (1,1) exists for all M 1 and M 2 in this example, although this is not true in general. Also, because ij is relatively small, equilibrium = (0,0) exists for all but very high values of M 1 and M 2 . Equilibria where only one currency circulates internationally exist only if the other currency is not too abundant. For example, = (1,0) exists only if M 1 is not too big. In Figure 2b we examine variation in 11 and 12 . Now equilibrium = (1,1) exists in only a small region of the figure. Equilibrium = (0,0) exists if and only if 12 is below some cutoff. Also notice that as either 11 or 12 increases, it becomes more likely that equilibrium = (1,0) exists. This is because as Country 1 increases either its internal economic activity or its openness, sellers in Country 1 value money more highly and this makes Country 2 buyers more willing to deal with them.
POLICY
In this section we analyze the effects of changes in (M 1 , M 2 ) in the model with divisible output and endogenize (M 1 , M 2 ) by modeling the objective functions of the two governments and the rules for their strategic interaction. Because for some questions analytical results are difficult to derive, we analyze numerically an example with u(q)= q. The features that we highlight are ones that we can either prove an- alytically to hold in general or those which seem to be robust to alternative parameterizations in examples. Because Government i is assumed to purchase goods from a fraction M i of its newborn citizens, per capita seigniorage revenue in real terms is given by S i = M i q ii . One can show that S 1 first increases and then decreases with M 1 . Also, given that multiple equilibria exist, S 1 is greater when Currency 1 is international than when it is not and lower when Currency 2 is international than when it is not. Finally, given M 2 , S 1 is maximized at different levels of M 1 in the different regimes, depending on the extent to which Country 1 is able to export inflation abroad.
We define welfare as the average (steady state) utility of private citizens:
Which regime yields the highest welfare depends on M 1 and M 2 . For instance, if M 1 is very low, then W 1 is highest in regime = (1,0), where Currency 2 is accepted in Country 1 but not vice versa, because this makes trade easier within the host country. Also, = (1,1) may or may not dominate = (0,0). For instance, if M 2 is very low or very high, then W 1 is highest in regime = (0,0). The next step is to endogenize (M 1 , M 2 ). We assume that governments take the regime as given and restrict their choices to policies that allow for the existence of that regime as an equilibrium (that is, we ignore policies aimed at changing a currency's realm of circulation). 11 We also restrict attention to policies that do not change over time and to steady-state comparisons.
We look for Nash equilibria when each government seeks to maximize the welfare of its own citizens, denoted (M 1
W is taken as given and vice versa. We also look for Nash equilibria when each government seeks to maximize seigniorage, denoted (M 1 S , M 2 S ). Given that they seek to maximize seigniorage, we also consider the possibility of international policy coordination by letting the governments choose policies jointly. One way to do this is to assume that seigniorage is freely transferable across countries, in which case they maximize S 1 + S 2 . We denote this outcome by Regions in ( 11 , 12 ) Space where the Different Equilibria Exist governments. As neither government takes into account the effect it has on the other, the noncooperative equilibrium is characterized by too much money. The cooperative equilibrium (M 1 N , M 2 N ) involves less money and more seigniorage.
These results hold in general. We now describe in more detail the findings from the numerical examples. We depict the frontier and the outcomes in (S 1 , S 2 ) space, assuming the regime is = (1,0) in Figure 3a and = (1,1) in Figure 3b (the regime with no international currency is uninteresting for this exercise). The points labeled W, S, T, and N are the payoffs in the four scenarios: the noncooperative equilibrium between welfare maximizers, the noncooperative equilibrium between seigniorage maximizers, the cooperative solution when revenue is transferable, and the cooperative solution when revenue is nontransferable. In the transferable revenue case, the point T depicts the seigniorage raised in each country and not the final division of the revenue between the governments. Figures 4a and 4b show the same points in (W 1 , W 2 ) space. Because the graphs are drawn using the same scales, one thing they illustrate is how the possible values of seigniorage and welfare vary across regimes. For a 11 1,a 12 0.15,a 21 0.15,a 22 1,  r 0.1,g 0.02   (a) λ (1,0) (b) λ (1,1) For a 11 1,a 12 0.15,a 21 0.15,a 22 1,  r 0.1,g 0.02   (b) λ (1,1) The results we wish to highlight are as follows. First, though the cooperative solutions are on the frontier in (S 1 , S 2 ) space, the noncooperative solutions are inside the frontier. This is especially so in regime = (1,1), where it is easiest to export inflation. Also, Figure 3a shows that in regime = (1,0), when transfers are allowed, the cooperative solution is to concentrate seigniorage collection in Country 2, where it can be done more efficiently. That is, the governments print more of the international currency and less of the national currency in addition to printing less money in total. Figure 4 shows how the possible values of (W 1 , W 2 ) are much higher in regime = (1,1). However, each of the outcomes is inside the frontier. Also, when both governments try to maximize seigniorage, one of them may actually end up with less seigniorage than when both are trying to maximize welfare. Symmetrically, citizens in one country may be worse off in terms of welfare when both governments are trying to maximize welfare than when both governments are concerned with seigniorage, as can be seen in the figure for Country 1 in regime = (1,0). Finally, in regime = (1,0), the country that issues international money is better off.
Feasible and Equilibrium Seigniorage
Feasible and Equilibrium Welfare
FINAL REMARKS
This article has summarized some recent results in the literature on searchtheoretic models of international currency. We think that models in this class will eventually prove useful for studying important issues in international monetary economics. The analysis illustrates the potential welfare gains from having one currency (or two currencies that serve as perfect substitutes). However, it also indicates that there can be a welfare loss in one country from having a unified currency if another country is pursuing a particularly bad policy from the former's point of view. It may be interesting to consider versions of the model where the two countries have different preferences or production technologies or are subject to different shocks to analyze the tradeoffs between having one currency, one central bank or both. While this may help to facilitate trade, it makes it more difficult to have independent monetary policies tailored to conditions in the individual economies. We leave this to future research.
